

The participation of Brazil as a possible signatory to the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement.

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The participation of Brazil as a possible signatory to the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement (AP - INFCIRC 540) considers a careful observation of the pros and cons in relation to the current panorama of the development of Brazilian nuclear science and of policy. Brazil is currently under international pressure to sign the AP - INFCIRC 540 which aims to give more powers to the International Atomic Energy Agency in its inspections of nuclear activities. Brazil's nuclear foreign policy had Americanism as its main axis, but it was marked by the Brazilian state's participation in international nuclear regimes and agreements that included a series of agreements with non-traditional partners. However, even though the U.S. was Brazil's main importer of minerals, it not only restricted the diffusion of nuclear technology, but also wanted Brazil not to develop it. Among these agreements is the Treaty for the Prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean – 1967. In addition to this treaty there are two protocols. Protocol 1: submit all non-Latin American countries with territories in the region to the terms of the treaty, and Protocol 2: The States Parties do not apply the use nuclear weapons and not to threaten the Contracting Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco with their use. The nuclear programs of Brazil and Argentina began in the 1950s and enabled both to acquire by the 1980s the technology for the entire nuclear cycle, including the mining, prospecting, exploration, extraction, concentration, purification, conversion, and enrichment of uranium. From then on, joint declarations were developed signaling progress in building transparency between the two states. In 1990, Guadalajara Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy establishes a system of mutual inspections - Creation of the Brazilian Argentinean Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) to develop a new perspective for cooperation and integration. The Brazilian Nuclear Policy has its origin in the

Brazilian Constitution (1988) and according to GUIMARÃES, 2011. “*The National Defense Strategy (NDS), approved by Decree No. 6.703 of December 18, 2008, states that Brazil shall not adhere to additions to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons designed to extend the Treaty's restrictions without the nuclear powers having made progress on the Treaty's central premise: “their own nuclear disarmament”.* Through this agreement, states parties agree to accept the application of safeguards to all nuclear materials in all nuclear activities conducted within their territory, under their jurisdiction or under their control anywhere, with the sole purpose of ensuring that such materials are not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” [1]. Argentina and Brazil ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in 1997 and 1998, respectively.

Regarding Brazil and the AP - INFCIRC 540 are concerned, paradoxically, the country is already subject to a comprehensive safeguard's regime carried out by the ABACC with the support of the IAEA. The NPT already includes both unannounced and warned inspections. What the additional protocol does is to change the approach, because currently the inspection is done based on what the country the country declares. That is, it is based on international confidence in the information disclosed. Furthermore, there is no area of technology in which people do not protect their secrets. Brazilian technology is more efficient than that of other countries, especially when it comes to the resistance of the centrifuge equipment. In the nuclear area, it is not possible to register patents, also because this would require the disclosure of a series of information that could be used for non-peaceful purposes (GONÇALVES,2006). The rejection of the NPT is based on the defense of sovereignty and the copyright of autonomous development of technology by our country. There is no sovereign country without research, technological development, and innovation.

References

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